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The concept of materiality – in the EU known as (price) relevance – is key to both
the insider trading ban and the continuous disclosure obligation under EU and US
securities regulation. The insider trading bans prohibit market participants from
trading on non-public, material information. The EU continuous disclosure obligation
requires issuers of financial instruments to publish any material information that is
not publicly known and directly concerns those issuers. Both EU and US securities
regimes measure materiality from the perspective of a “reasonable investor”.
However, courts have reached differing conclusions on how rational reasonable
investors really are. In the US, courts largely consider the reasonable investor to
be a personification of perfectly rational markets. In Germany, the Federal Court
of Justice has deemed that reasonable investors take into account the irrational
reactions of other market participants, but has neglected to examine whether,
by taking such reactions into account, the reasonable investor herself becomes
irrational. This presentation offers to answer that question by using a simple market
model that incorporates both information traders as well as utilitarian/liquidity traders,
i.e., traders who seek out exploitable information versus those who stay rationally
uninformed. Perhaps surprisingly, the model shows that the reasonable investor as
viewed by the law is in fact perfectly rational, suggesting that EU courts ought to
follow the standard applied by US courts.
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